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1 Introduction
The 2008 Great Recession left behind a legacy in the form of the highest public debt
burdens ever registered and1, as of 2019, some of the world’s most important economic
areas such as the Eurozone still face debt-to-GDP ratios higher than 100%. These high
levels of sovereign debt are associated with several economic issues, such as increased
exposure to market sentiment, or the loss of flexibility in the implementation of fiscal
policy, especially important as a stabilization mechanism in times where monetary policy
is constrained by the low interest rate environment. Furthermore, as discussed in OECD
(2010), in the near future government finances will face additional pressures due to the
ageing of the population. Considering the issues at hand, there are arguments in favor
of a further consolidation effort. However, reducing debt also has downsides, the most
important being the recessive impacts it brings on the economy, extensively documented
throughout the literature, e.g., Alesina et al. (2015b), Guajardo et al. (2014),
Yang et al. (2015).
The design of fiscal plans is then a delicate task for policymakers, which must balance
the pros and cons of reducing debt. This paper intends to add to the discussion on plan
design, by focusing on an often-overlooked feature of fiscal consolidations, the speed of
deleveraging. One can define speed as the decision of how long to extend a consolidation
program, after the size of the debt reduction has been chosen. In other words, for a
given debt reduction target, authorities can choose to pay debt quickly, or spread out the
adjustment for a longer number of periods. The importance of considering this feature
in fiscal plan design was highlighted by Blanchard and Leigh (2013). In their article,
the authors criticized the lack of discussion on the timing of adjustments, presenting
arguments in favor of both fast and slow consolidations. This work intends to bring
this debate into formal research, by addressing the following questions: How do fiscal
consolidations affect social welfare? What is the optimal speed for fiscal consolidations?
Does the fiscal instrument used matters when defining speed?
To answer these questions, this work builds on the neoclassical macroeconomic model
1Considering only non-war times.
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of Brinca et al. (2018), featuring heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets, to
study the response of social welfare to fiscal consolidations and to different speeds of
adjustment. Firstly, the model is calibrated to match key characteristics of the economy of
Germany. Secondly, a sequence of fiscal consolidations consisting of 10 percentage points
reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio is performed. The reduction of debt is financed
either with a decrease in government spending, or with an increase in the labor income
tax. The number of periods (years) of adjustment is changed across simulations, and the
social welfare implications of doing so are quantified. The number of years are chosen to
vary between 5 and 70 years. This decision is made with basis on historical data on fiscal
consolidations, obtained via the creation of a novel dataset, resulting from the merger of
data included in Alesina et al. (2015a) and Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2015b).
Three main results arise from the experiments: i) Fiscal consolidations are welfare
improving on the aggregate, but the welfare effects are heterogeneous across the wealth
distribution. More concretely, due to lower real interest rates during the debt reduction
path, borrowers win and savers lose out. The aggregate response depends on the relative
strength of these effects. ii) Welfare improvements are larger in spending-based than
in tax-based consolidations. iii) Ideally, the speed of fiscal consolidations should be as
slow as possible. This is the case since credit constrained agents are unable to borrow in
response to adjustments, and thus benefit from a more gradual adjustment path, which
helps them achieve a better smoothing of consumption. The remainder of the paper
is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 describes the
overlapping generations model and the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 deals with the
calibration procedure along with relevant data sources. Section 5 introduces the dataset
used to delimit the experiment range and details the profile of the fiscal experiments.
Section 6 portrays the experiments’ results while explaining the relevant macroeconomic
dynamics that drive them. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
There are three branches of literature related with this work. i) Firstly, one that relates
factors such as country characteristics or the fiscal instrument used with the consequences
of fiscal consolidations. ii) Secondly, a more closely related branch that studies the welfare
implications of fiscal consolidations, with basis on theoretical macroeconomic modelling.
iii) Thirdly, a very narrow selection of papers that address the topic of the speed of fiscal
adjustments.
i) Ilzetsky et al. (2013) found that the size of fiscal multipliers depended on country
specific characteristics, such as the income level of the country, or the sovereign debt
burden. Anderson et al. (2016) used a calibrated Keynesian model with sticky prices to
show that economic agents responded differently to fiscal shocks, depending on individual
characteristics such as age, income and wealth levels. In turn, Brinca et al. (2018)
developed a neoclassical life-cycle economy to find that wealth levels and credit constraints
were key factors in explaining heterogeneity in the impacts of consolidations. Alesina
et al. (2015b) concluded that taxation-based consolidations originated larger recessive
impacts than consolidations with basis on public spending decreases. The main takeaways
in the scope of this work are that the impacts of consolidations are contingent on country
characteristics, namely on wealth inequality, and also on the instrument used.
ii) The relationship between fiscal consolidations and social welfare is often studied
with resource to macroeconomic modelling. Following the seminal contribution of Aiya-
gari (1994), most theoretical frameworks in nowadays’ research admit agent heterogene-
ity and credit market incompleteness. Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) built on this
contribution to study the welfare implications of public debt, finding that opposite effects
appeared. On the benefit side, higher debt loosened borrowing constraints and allowed for
a better smoothing of consumption. On the negative side, however, public debt crowded
out capital, hence lowering real wages. They finished concluding that the debt-to-GDP
ratio that maximized welfare hovered around 2/3. More recently, Ro¨hrs and Winter
(2017) revisited this topic, finding that steady state welfare was at the maximum when
the debt-to-GDP ratio was negative and around -0.8, in stark contrast with Aiyagari
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and McGrattan (1998). Their results were unlike since the calibration in Ro¨hrs and
Winter (2017) presented more realistic levels of wealth and earnings inequality, again
showing the relevance of these variables in determining welfare effects. However, the
authors also found that when considering the transition path to the new steady state,
fiscal consolidations became welfare reducing, highlighting the importance of transitional
analysis, and motivating the focus on this aspect in the present work.
iii) In general, the literature on optimal fiscal policy focuses on the welfare effects of
debt, as seen in ii), with other components of the fiscal plan, such as the speed of debt
reduction being less discussed. In this essence, Philippon and Rolda´n (2018) studied
paths of reduction in government debt, finding that the optimal speed of adjustment
varied amongst agents, depending on their asset position. Finnally, the paper that stands
closest to this work is that of Romei (2017), which uses a calibrated, heterogeneous
agents, incomplete markets neoclassical economy to study the welfare implications of
the fiscal instrument and the speed of consolidation. The main finding is in accordance
with Philippon and Rolda´n (2018), households’ preference over the mix of speed
and instrument of consolidation hinges on the distribution of wealth. Romei (2017)
argued that the real interest path resulting from a certain combination of fiscal instrument
and speed of adjustment would determine household preference over the shock. Wealth
inequality again played a key role, as savers favoured an increasing path in the interest
rate, while borrowers would rather face a decreasing one. In the own words of the author,
these results led to the research only taking a positive view, describing the winners and
losers, and absconding from commenting on optimal policy.
This paper intends to pick up where Romei (2017) left, by adding a normative facet
to the analysis, with the goal to not only characterize the impacts of different plan speeds
on welfare, but also to find an optimal policy for the speed of public debt reductions.
In order to achieve a better characterization of optimal policy in a societal context, the
model used is the one of Brinca et al. (2018), that relaxes the infinitely lived households
assumption of Romei (2017) and considers a bequest motive for a better calibration of
assets over the life-cycle.
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3 Model
The model chosen to study the optimal speed of fiscal consolidations is a neoclassical life-
cycle economy, with heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets and uninsurable income
risk. The model is close to the one used in Brinca et al. (2016), but a bequest motive
was introduced to better approximate the wealth levels of the older population to reality,
in the same manner as in Brinca et al. (2019).
Technology
A representative firm produces output following a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = (Kt, Lt) = K
a
t L
1−a
t (1)
where Kt represents the capital input at time t and Lt represents the efficient units of
labor input at time t. Capital varies across time according to the equation:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (2)
with It standing for gross investment in period t, and δ for the capital depreciation rate.
In each period, firms decide on the amount of capital and labor used in production, as to
maximize profits:
Πt = Yt − wtLt − (rt + δ)Kt (3)
In a competitive equilibrium, factors of production are paid according to their marginal
productivity, therefore factor prices will be given by:
wt = ∂Yt/∂Lt = (1− α)
(
Kt
Lt
)α
(4)
rt = ∂Yt/∂Kt − δ = α
(
Kt
Lt
)α−1
− δ (5)
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Demographics
The population consists of J overlapping generations of households, with finite lifespans,
and is assumed constant across time 2. Households start life at age 20, and reach retire-
ment by age 65, implying that there are 45 model periods of working life (a period in
the model corresponds to 1 year). After retirement, households face an age-dependent
probability of dying, π(j), where j represents the household’s age. Consequently, the
age-dependent probability of survival is given by ω(j) = 1− π(j). At age 100 households
die with certainty3, π(100) = 1. Moreover, the size of each age group in the model is
normalized to 1. As a consequence, the total normalized workforce population will be 45
at all times, and, by the law of large numbers, the mass of retired agents of a determined
age group j (with j ≥ 65), alive at any given period will be equal to Ωj =
∏i=j
i=65 ω(i).
Then, the total retired population will be equal to
∑j=100
j=65 Ωj and the overall normalized
population level equal to
(
45 +
∑j=100
j=65 Ωj
)
.
Households are also heterogeneous with respect to asset holdings, idiosyncratic produc-
tivity, their subjective discount factor and permanent ability. Differing in asset holdings
simply means households are allowed to have different wealth levels. Idiosyncratic produc-
tivity concerns individual’s own unknown characteristics that may affect his productivity.
The discount factor can take one out of three values β ∈ {β1, β2, β3} with the same prob-
ability, and is constant over time for each household. This implies households can weigh
differently future utility when making their consumption, savings and working decisions.
The permanent ability component corresponds to the starting productivity level at birth,
different across households.
Deceased households leave behind bequests that are assumed to be redistributed in a
lump-sum fashion between the households that are alive. The per-household bequest is
denoted by Γ. Retired households’ utility is increasing in the bequest left behind at time
of death. This way, it is assured that retirees leave behind some wealth when they die,
which ultimately is necessary to calibrate the asset holdings of old households.4
2There is no population growth, the newborns exactly offset the deceased.
3Consequently J = 81
4As retired households don’t work, their utility depends singlely on consumption, therefore by optimiz-
ing, retirees would consume as much as possible, running out savings until death. In the U.S., households
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Labor Income
Due to household heterogeneity, wages will depend on individual characteristics. The
wage of each individual, wi, is given by:
wi(j, a, u) = we
γ1j+γ2j2+γ3j3+a+u (6)
where j represents age, a ∼ N(0, σ2a) permanent ability, γ1, γ2, γ3 capture the age profile
of wages, ω the wage per efficient unit of labor (determined in a competitive equilibrium
as depicted on the previous subsection) and u represents the idiosyncratic productivity
shock, which follows an AR(1) process:
ut+1 = ρut + ǫt+1, ǫ ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ ) (7)
Preferences
The utility function of a household, U(c, n), depends positively on consumption and neg-
atively on work hours, n ∈ [0, 1], taking the form:
U(c, n) =
c1−σ
1− σ
− χ
n1+η
1 + η
(8)
where σ represents the risk aversion coefficient, χ the parameter for the disutility of work,
and η the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. In addition to this, the utility of retired
households is also increasing in the bequest left at time of death:
D(k) = ϕlog(k) (9)
where ϕ represents the coefficient of bequest utility.
Government
The government runs both a social security system, and its own budget, used for public
expenditure.
aged more than 75 years old held, on average, 50990 dollars just in assets at financial institutions, be-
ing the richest age group according to U.S. Census Bureau data from 2016. Having zero assets at time
of death, or even very low average assets in the age group is then not empirically plausible, hence the
introduction of the bequest motive.
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The social security system is balanced. Employees and employers are taxed at rates
τss and τ˜ss, respectively, with the tax proceedings flowing to the social security payments
to the elderly, Ψt.
As stated, the government also runs its own budget for policy. It levies taxes on con-
sumption, labor and capital income and uses them to finance public consumption goods,
Gt, interest payments on debt, rBt, and a lump-sum redistribution, gt. Consumption and
capital income are taxed at flat rates τc and τk, respectively. Labor income tax takes
a non-linear form, as introduced by Be´nabou (2002) in dynamic macro models with
heterogeneous agents, and used in Brinca et al. (2018):
τl(y) = 1− θ0y
−θ1 (10)
where y represents labor income (pre-tax) and τl(y) the tax rate given a pre-tax income
y, a level of taxation, θ0, and a progressivity of taxes of θ1. If θ1 = 0, then τl = 1 − θ0
implying that there is no progressivity and all levels of income are taxed at the same
flat rate. For θ1 > 0, the tax system becomes progressive. Heathcote et al. (2017)
demonstrated that this function was an adequate fit for U.S. tax/transfer scheme data.5.
In steady state, public debt, government revenues and expenditures are assumed pro-
portional to output. Denoting government revenues from labor, capital and consumption
taxes by R and government revenues from social security taxation by Rss, the steady state
government budget constraint takes the form:
g
(
45 +
j=100∑
j=65
Ωj
)
+G+ rB = R, (11)
Ψ
(
j=100∑
j=65
Ωj
)
= Rss. (12)
with equation (11) representing the government’s policy budget and (12) the social secu-
rity system.
5Appendix 8.1 contains a more detailed description of the properties of the non-linear tax function.
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Recursive Formulation of the Household Problem
Each household is characterized by the vector of parameters (k, β, a, u, j), with k rep-
resenting household savings, β ∈ {β1, β2, β3} the time discount factor, a the permanent
ability component, u the idiosyncratic productivity shock and j the age of the household.
At each given time, the household will choose the optimal amount of consumption (c),
hours worked (n), and future asset holdings (k′)6. This optimization problem can be
formulated recursively as:
V (k, β, a, u, j) = max
c,k′,n
[
U(c, n) + βEu′
[
V (k′, β, a, u, j + 1)
]]
s.t :
(13)
c(1 + τc) + k
′ = (k + Γ)(1 + r(1− τk)) + g + Y
L (14)
Y L =
nw(j, a, u)
1 + τ˜ss
[
1− τss − τl
(
nw(j, a, u)
1 + τ˜ss
)]
n ∈ [0, 1], k′ ≥ −b, c > 0
(15)
Households maximize utility and the expected future value, discounted for intertem-
poral preference, as seen in (13). Their consumption and savings decisions are limited
by available wealth and disposable income7, represented by the budget constraint (14).
Equation (15) denotes household’s after-tax labor income8, Y L.
Retired households optimize with the additional features of not making the labor sup-
ply decision, having a probability π(j) of dying, recieving utility from leaving a bequest9,
6b represents the borrowing limit.
7Disposable income is devided between after-tax capital income, (k + Γ)(r(1 − τk)) , after-tax labor
income, Y L, and the lump-sum transfer recieved from the government, g. Wealth at period t is denoted
by (k + Γ).
8Where τ˜ss and τss are the social security taxes paid by the employer and employee respectively, and
τl is the labor income tax.
9Notice that the older the household gets, the higher its probability of dying is, and thus, a higher
weight is given to the bequest utility in his optimization problem. This way it is ensured that the older
he gets, the more he will be inclined to save in each period, in proportion to consumption. This allows
the calibration of the model for retirees’ assets.
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D(k′), and recieving the social security payment, Ψ:
V (k, β, j) = max
c,k′
[
U(c) + β
[
(1− π(j))V (k′, β, j + 1) + π(j)D(k′)
]]
s.t :
c(1 + τc) + k
′ = (k + Γ)(1 + r(1− τk)) + g +Ψ
k′ ≥ 0, c > 0
(16)
Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Considering Φ(k, β, a, u, j) as a measure of households with the corresponding character-
istics, the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is defined by:
1. The consumers’ optimization problem is solved by the value function V (k, β, a, u, j)
and the policy functions c(k, β, a, u, j), k′(k, β, a, u, j) and n(k, β, a, u, j).
2. Markets clear:
K +B =
∫
kdΦ
L =
∫ [
n(k, β, a, u, j)
]
dΦ∫
cdΦ + δK +G = KαL1−α
3. The factor prices satisfy:
w = (1− α)
(
K
L
)α
r = α
(
K
L
)α−1
− δ
4. The government budget balances:
g
∫
dΦ +G+ rB =
∫ [
τkr(k + Γ) + τcc+ nτl
(
nw(j, a, u)
1 + τ˜ss
)]
dΦ
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5. The social security system balances:
Ψ
∫
j≥65
dΦ =
[
τ˜ss + τss
1 + τ˜ss
(∫
j<65
nwdΦ
)]
6. The assets of the dead are uniformly distributed among the living:
Γ
∫
j<65
dΦ + Γ
∫
j≥65
ω(j)dΦ =
∫
(1− ω(j))kdΦ
4 Calibration
The model of Section 3 is calibrated to match the economy of Germany, using the method-
ology of Brinca et al. (2018). Germany was chosen as the proxy economy due to its
relevance in the context of the EU. The calibration is divided in two steps. Firstly, there
is a set of parameters for which there is available data and thus are introduced directly in
the model. These are shown in Table 5 of Appendix 8.2. Secondly, there are unobserved
parameters that must be calibrated endogenously, as there are no direct empirical coun-
terparts. This second step is carried out using the simulated method of moments (SMM),
and the resulting values for the parameters are shown in Table 6 of Appendix 8.2. The
remainder of this section describes the most relevant steps in the calibration process.
Labor Income
The estimation of the life cycle profile of wages, equation 6, was retrieved from Brinca
et al. (2018). Using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), they estimate the
following regression for each country:
ln(wi) = ln(w) + γ1j + γ2j
2 + γ3j
3 + ǫi, (17)
where j is the age of individual i and w the equilibrium real wage as determined by
equation 4. Naturally, there is no available data for the permanent ability, a, and id-
iosyncratic productivity shock, u, which integrate the error term, ǫi. The variance of the
permanent ability, σa, and the persistence of the income shock, ρ, are assumed constant
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across countries and set equal to the values found by Brinca et al. (2016) in their cali-
bration. Finally, taking these two parameters as a given, the variance of the idiosyncratic
income risk, σu, is calibrated endogenously to match the model variance of wages with
the correspondent value from the data, to be further explained below.
Preferences
The risk aversion coefficient, σ, is set equal to 1.2, a value consistent with the literature.
In the same manner, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set equal to 1, in accordance
with the recent pieces of Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and Guner et al. (2014). The
parameters for the disutility of work, χ, the coefficient of bequest utility, ϕ, the discount
factors, {β1, β2, β3} and the borrowing limit, b, are all amongst the parameters calibrated
endogenously.
Government
The level of taxation and the progressivity of taxes from the labor income tax function,
θ0 and θ1, were also taken from Brinca et al. (2018), which uses U.S labor income tax
data from the OECD for its estimation. The social security taxes paid by the employee
and employer were calibrated using the average rates for each country from 2001 to 2007,
with data also retrieved from the OECD. The tax on consumption and capital, tc, tk, were
set for each country according to the values in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).
Endogenously calibrated parameters
The following parameters don’t have a direct empirical counterpart:{ϕ, β1, β2, β3, b, χ,
σu} As previously stated, these parameters must be calibrated endogenously, resorting to
the Simulated Method of Moments. The method consists in minimizing the subsequent
loss function10:
L(ϕ, β1, β2, β3, b, χ, σu) = ‖Mm −Md‖ (18)
Md corresponds to the data moment and Mm to the analogue model moment. The
ensuing value of the loss function can be understood as the percentual error in the model
10The full expression of the loss function is depicted in appendix 8.3.
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calibration i.e the distance of the model moments to the real-life data. As there are seven
unknowns, seven data moments are necessary to have a just identified equation system.
The chosen calibration targets, Md, and the corresponding model moments, Mm are:
Table 1: Calibration Targets and Model Fit
Calibration target Description Data value Md Model value Mm
K/Y Capital-output ratio 3.013 3.017
n¯ Average hours worked per capita 0.189 0.189
Var ln(ω) Variance of log wages 0.354 0.354
W 75−80/W Mean wealth age 75-80 / Mean wealth 1.513 1.514
Q1, Q2, Q3 Wealth Quartiles -0.0036, 0.0273, 0.1788 -0.0057, 0.0245, 0.1799
Note: Data for Q1, Q2, Q3 and W 75−80/W was taken from the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), while Var ln(ω) came from the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The capital-output ratio was retireved from the Penn World Table 8.0 and n¯ from the OECD
Economic Outlook.
The targets concerning the wealth distribution, {Q1, Q2, Q3} and W 75−80/W , were
chosen in order for the calibrated model to present a realistic distribution of wealth over
the population and the life-cycle, respectively. Hours worked and the variance of wages are
necessary to approximate labor market features to reality, especially important considering
that in this model most short-run effects from fiscal shocks materialize through variations
in the supply of labor. The capital-output ratio characterizes the production sector of
the economy. The values of the endogenous parameters are then adjusted until the error
given by the loss function is as small as possible. The simulated economy is calibrated
with an error of 0.83%. The endogenously calibrated parameters are shown on Table 6 of
Appendix 8.2.
5 Fiscal Experiment
5.1 Description
The calibration of Section 4 describes the steady-state equilibrium. The fiscal experi-
ments depart from this equilibrium, and consist of 10 percentage points reductions in the
debt-to-GDP ratio, Bt/Yt, occurring during a different number of periods (years) in each
experiment. The number of years in each simulation is denoted by the parameter N .
The experiment processes as follows: the reduction in government debt will be financed
either through a decrease in government spending, Gt, or an increase in the labor income
14
tax, τl. The government surplus in each period will correspond to 10/N per cent of that
year’s GDP, ensuring that the debt-to-GDP ratio is reduced at the same rate each year.
This constant rate of adjustment will be denoted by “average yearly adjustment”, A, and
due to the linear relation with N , it is is considered an analogue measure of speed in the
context of the experiments. After the N periods of adjustment are concluded, the value
of government spending or the labor income tax rate go back to their initial levels. To
reach a new steady state, it is assumed that the economy takes an additional 100 − N
number of years, with the lumpsum transfer, g, set to clear the government budget.
The formal definition of the transition equilibrium during the experiment is stated in
Appendix 8.3. The difference in relation to the steady-state equilibrium is the presence of
the state variable time, t. The numerical solution of the model involves guessing the paths
for all time dependent variables, and then solving the maximization problem backwards,
after which the guess is updated. This method is in line with Krusell and Smith
(1999). The next section will define an empirically plausible range for the parameter
governing the number of years of adjustment, N .
5.2 Empirical background
The range for the parameter N was defined with basis on historical fiscal consolidation
data. For that purpose, a dataset was constructed by merging data fromAlesina, Favero
and Giavazzi (2015b) with data from Alesina et al. (2015a). The first paper’s data
is based on the Devries et al. (2011) dataset on fiscal consolidations for 17 OECD
countries, from the period 1978-2009. The second paper is a complement to the first,
since for the same countries it depicts only data for the period 2009-2013, especially rele-
vant due to containing the fiscal programs enforced during the 2010 European sovereign
debt crisis. In both pieces, the authors use the “narrative approach” pioneered in Romer
and Romer (2010) to identify exogenous fiscal consolidations. This approach selects
fiscal consolidation episodes via a review of historical documents, choosing only the im-
provements in government finances caused by the direct intent to reduce deficits or debt.
This way, all the variations in the improvements in government accounts caused by the
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business cycle or other types of governmental policy are filtered out. The final dataset
containing 60 fiscal plans for 17 OECD countries during 1978-2013, along with method-
ological changes applied, can be consulted in Appendix 8.4. Figure 1 summarizes the
dataset, by ploting the fiscal plans by both the number of years of consolidation, N , and
the average yearly adjustment of each plan11, A.
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Figure 1: Historical data on the speed of fiscal consolidations
To calibrate the speed of adjustment from empirical data, the average yearly adjustment,
A, is chosen to define the upper and lower bounds for the debt repaying periods. It
represents the speed of adjustment well since it shows the pace at which governments have
reduced debt in a per year basis, in past consolidations. The maximum and minimum
values ever registered, correspond to 3.43 in Portugal 2010-2013 and to 0.14 in USA 1978,
respectively. Considering these rates of adjustment in the expression pioneered in Section
5.112, in the context of the experiment, N will be delimited by:
MinN = 10/3.425 = 2.91 MaxN = 10/0.140 = 71.42
To simplify computations, the range will be normalized to N ∈ [5; 70]. Furthermore,
due to the amount of time and computational effort to run each simulation, inside the
11From the data, the average yearly adjustment (A), was calculated in each plan by computing the
average of the fiscal improvements as a % of GDP throughout the plan’s years. It can be interpreted as
the average pp reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio each period, had government accounts been initially
balanced and no other changes made to the budget other than the ones depicted by the consolidation
data, in the same sense as it was defined in the context of the experiment. Please consult Appendix 8.4
for a more detailed explanation.
12In the experiment, the average yearly adjustment formula corresponds to A = 10/N and therefore,
for a given level of A, the number of periods of adjustment is given by N = 10/A
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defined range, simulations will be run for N = {5, 10, 20, 50, 70}. These simulations will
be made, either with taxation, or spending. The results will be summarized and explained
in Section 6.
5.3 Definition of the Welfare Measure
The welfare measure used to compare the impacts of changing the number of years, N ,
across fiscal experiments, is the expected life-time social welfare at time t, and is defined
as:
SWt = E
[
V
]
t
=
1∫
dΦ
[ ∫
j<65
V (k, β, a, u, j)t dΦ +
∫
j≥65
V (k, β, j)t dΦ
]
(19)
This measure is an average of the sum of life-time utility at time t, for all individuals
in all generations. The goal is to compare initial steady-sate welfare at t = 1, with the
corresponding welfare in t = 1 in a state of the world where the consolidation is put in
practice. This way, the variation in the social welfare between the two states captures the
average life-time utility gain (or loss) from the fiscal consolidation.
6 Results
This section details the results of the fiscal experiments, explaining the mechanisms that
drive them. On a first stage, Section 6.1 focuses on the welfare effects of debt reductions,
both in spending-based and tax-based consolidations. Section 6.2 follows, detailing how
the welfare effects vary when the number of years of consolidation, N , is changed.
In the first section, the role of wealth inequality is highlighted as the main factor
in explaining welfare gains (or losses) from the consolidations. More concretely, due to
changes in the real interest rate during the adjustment, the wealth-poor and wealth-
rich have opposite reactions to fiscal consolidations. Furthermore, they also disagree in
the preference for the fiscal instrument. The aggregate welfare response will depend on
the relative strength of the preferences among the two groups. In the second section,
the presence of borrowing constrained agents is argued to be the main dictator of the
aggregate response to different speeds of adjustment.
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6.1 Welfare Effects of Reducing Debt
This section will lay out the macroeconomic dynamics behind fiscal consolidations, and
the intuition behind the ensuing welfare effects. As stated, to understand the aggregate
variation, the welfare changes will be decomposed and evaluated by wealth group. The
following discussion begins, considering firstly the case where the fiscal consolidation is
spending-based, and then develops.
Key Dynamics
The economy is initially in a steady state equilibrium when the government unexpectedly
implements a fiscal consolidation, by decreasing expenditures, G. When authorities start
running down debt, the saving pattern of households is affected. Foreseeing higher future
income13, households desire to reduce savings and consume more in each period. However,
some of them are credit constrained, and thus, are unable to dissave as much as they
wanted. As households can either save in the form of capital or government bonds,
with savings decreasing by less than the fall in the amount of bonds, the capital stock
will increase. In turn, this drives the economy’s capital-to-labor ratio up. There is a
crowding-in of capital. When each worker is equipped with a higher level of capital, its
productivity increases, and, therefore, according to the market clearing equation 4, wages
will be higher. Thus, the first main consequence of reducing debt is a rising path of
wages. In turn, the path of wages generates both an income effect and an inter-temporal
substitution effect on the supply of labor. Regarding the income effect, the prospects of a
higher lifetime income induces households to decrease their supply of labor in each period,
and enjoy more leisure. Besides this, workers will also desire to trade-off hours worked
today for hours worked tomorrow, when wages will be higher. This is the inter-temporal
substitution effect. Thus, labor supply contracts sharply on the short run, and then trends
upwardly accompanying the growth of wages. This results in a fall in output in the short
run, but in higher long run output, since both capital and labor will increase across time.
13Both in spending-based and tax-based consolidations, when the debt repayment period is over, both
G, and τl go back to the initial levels, while the interest payments of the government, rBt, are smaller.
This implies a higher level of government transfers, g, and thus, higher income.
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Overall, lifetime consumption will be higher. In summary, labor market effects from
consolidations increase welfare for the whole working population, since in each period
they work less, while still benefiting from higher lifetime levels of consumption.
On the other hand, however, real interest rates are decreasing throughout the consol-
idation period. Higher levels of productive capital imply that the marginal productivity
of the next unit of capital is lower, and, therefore, that the interest rates face a falling
path during the consolidation. The relations described above can be observed in Figure 2,
which plots the path of the capital stock, labor supply, the interest rate and the wage rate,
during the transition period, for both a spending-based, and a tax-based consolidation
spanning 50 periods.
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Figure 2: Comparison between the transition paths of the capital stock, labor supply, interest rate and after-tax wage
rate, between spending-based plans (smooth dark line), tax-based plans (dashed line) and the state of the world where the
economy remains in the initial steady state (lighter straight line). The fiscal plan represented consists in a 10 percentage
points reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio, concluded in 50 periods, N = 50.
Contrary to the labor market effects, the impacts of lower interest rates on welfare
are not as clear cut, as they depend on agents’ asset position. Intuitively, borrowers will
desire to face lower rates, while the opposite holds for savers. This way, wealth-poor agents
benefit from reductions in debt, while the wealth-rich lose out. The aggregate response of
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welfare to a fall in the interest rate is then determined by the relative strength of the two
groups. In this case, since the wealth-poor are also the consumption-poor, they have a
higher marginal utility of consumption, that is, they value more one more unit of income
than rich people and consequently their utility responds more strongly to variations in
income. However, and by observation of Table 2 below, this effect is countered by the
fact that the amount of capital income loss by the rich is also bigger than the capital
gains by the poor, as their stock of positive wealth outweighs the negative stock of the
poorest. Adding to this, rich individuals also lose via more expensive self-insurance14.
Considering the opposite forces at hand, the effect of the fall in interest rates in aggregate
welfare is ambiguous. Nonetheless, one can conclude that the fraction of the population
that enjoyed welfare gains, was the one more reliant on labor income than capital income,
corresponding to the first three wealth quintiles depicted below.
Table 2: Welfare Effects in a spending-based plan, G
Quintiles Wealth Level ∆Welfare
Q1 -0.09 - 0.00 +0.2795%
Q2 0.00 - 0.22 +0.2262%
Q3 0.22 - 0.84 +0.1303%
Q4 0.84 - 3.64 −0.0494%
Q5 3.64 - 15.13 −0.1591%
Total − +0.0760%
Note: The wealth levels are interpretable only on a com-
parative basis, and not on absolute terms. ∆ Welfare rep-
resents the response to changing from the initial steady
state, to a state of the world where the consolidation is
undertaken, with N = 50.
Although the individuals in the Q2 and Q3 have a positive level of wealth, and thus
lose from lower interest rates, the capital losses are offset by the labor income gains they
make due to higher wages. This is the case since they derive the primary source of income
from working. In conclusion, due to the marginal utility effect, and due to the fact that
there is a larger fraction of the population more dependent on labor income, there will be
14When markets are incomplete, wealthier agents incur in precautionary behavior, since there are no
insurance markets, hence ’incomplete markets’. Lower interest rates imply that agents get rewarded less
for self-insurance, and thus lose out, see Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998)
20
an aggregate welfare gain from the consolidation, despite the rich losing out.
Considering now consolidations where the government increases labor income taxation,
τl. In this case, household’s disposable income is directly affected by the government
policy, and will be lower during the transition, in comparison with the spending-based
consolidations. Since unconstrained households desire to smooth consumption, they will
borrow more in initial periods, and thus savings will decrease. Due to this behavior,
savings are reduced further than in spending-based consolidations, and the capital stock
will be lower too. In turn, this implies a lower path of wages, and thus, a higher path of
interest rates, in comparison with consolidations with G. These relations can be observed
in the previously shown Figure 2. As seen from the previous analysis, these dynamics will
prejudice the most labor income dependent agents and the wealth-poor, which constitute
the larger fraction of society. Therefore, tax-based consolidations have lower aggregate
welfare gains than spending-based consolidations. Notice also, that although the wealth-
rich prefer tax-based consolidations, their welfare still decreases, as ideally for them the
optimal would be for debt to increase. The results are summarized on Table 3 below.
Table 3: Welfare Effects in a tax-based plan, τl
Quintiles Wealth Level ∆Welfare
Q1 -0.09 - 0.00 +0.0496%
Q2 0.00 - 0.22 +0.0400%
Q3 0.22 - 0.84 +0.0229%
Q4 0.84 - 3.64 −0.0089%
Q5 3.64 - 15.13 −0.0281%
Total − +0.0134%
Note: The wealth levels are interpretable only on a com-
parative basis, and not on absolute terms. ∆ Welfare rep-
resents the response to changing from the initial steady
state, to a state of the world where the consolidation is
undertaken, with N = 50.
The findings from the welfare analysis are remarkable: with debt reductions (or increases),
governments have substantial redistributive power in hands. Via the wage and real interest
rate effects, governments can influence which fraction of society wins or loses. Further-
more, in aggregate terms, consolidations with G are more desirable than consolidations
21
with τl, a finding that is in line with the literature, e.g. (Blanchard and Perotti (2002);
Alesina et al. (2015b)), despite the rich and poor disagreeing on the instrument choice.
6.2 Welfare and the Speed of Fiscal Consolidations
Now that the dynamics of consolidations and the ensuing welfare effects are well under-
stood, the explanation moves on to the timing of debt reductions. Straight away, the
results from the simulations performed with a different number of adjustment periods are
presented in Table 4, for both types of fiscal instruments.
Table 4: Welfare Effects and the Speed of Adjustment
Fiscal Instrument
Number of years of adjustment, N
N = 5 N = 10 N = 20 N = 50 N = 70
Government Spending, G 0.0024% 0.0060% 0.0158% 0.0760% 0.1764%
Labor Income Taxation, τl 0.0004% 0.0011% 0.0027% 0.0134% 0.0337%
Note: Aggregate welfare variations from the initial steady state in t = 1, to the same period
in the state of the world where the consolidation is undertaken, for different timings of debt
reduction.
From observation, one concludes that welfare gains are at the maximum when the fiscal
adjustment is extremely back-loaded, spanning the maximum number of periods available.
In the context of the experiments, the optimal occurs when N=70, but due to the corner
nature of the solution, the optimal N would always be equal to the maximum number of
periods available for deleveraging.
The mechanism that explains the results interlinks three features of the model: credit
constraints, wealth inequality and the consumption smoothing hypothesis. As explained
on the previous section, in response to the fiscal shock, individuals desire to dissave and
to work less hours. While this verifies for unconstrained agents, this does not hold for
two types of agents: the borrowing constrained and the wealth-poor. In the case of the
constrained, they are unable to borrow anymore and thus are “hand-to-mouth”. In the
case of the wealth-poor, they respond less to future income changes because after starting
to run down savings in response to the shock they will become constrained too. This
way, both types of agents have a more rigid elasticity of labor supply, since they can’t
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just decrease hours worked and borrow to compensate for it at will. For example, they
are forced to work more hours during the transition path than they desire. Optimally,
they would want to work less and borrow to maintain consumption stable, postponing
working hours to later when the wage rates would become higher. As they are unable to
do so, the trade-off between consumption and leisure is sub-optimal and even though the
consolidation is beneficial for them, they lose out on some utility due to this inefficiency.
This is where the government plays a determinant role. By delaying the consolida-
tion, the government makes the debt reduction path and the subsequent response of the
macroeconomic variables inherently more smooth. If the adjustment is smoothed out for a
longer number of periods, although the hand-to-mouth are still unable to borrow, their de-
sire to do so is much smaller, as the per period shocks to income are lower. The slower the
consolidation, the more credit constrained agents’ behavior will resemble unconstrained
ones, and thus, more optimal is the trade-off between consumption and leisure, increasing
their utility. It is also important to revisit the fact that the borrowing constrained are the
poorest of all individuals in the economy, and therefore boast the higher marginal utility
of consumption. Thus, there are large aggregate gains to be made from a slower consoli-
dation speed, via increased consumption and utility levels for hand-to-mouth agents and
the wealth-poor.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributed to the literature on fiscal consolidations, by studying the welfare
effects of debt reductions, with particular focus on a less studied feature of fiscal plans,
the speed of deleveraging i.e. the number of years authorities take to achieve a given
debt reduction target. To do so, a neoclassical macroeconomic model was calibrated to
match key characteristics of the economy of Germany. Then, a sequence of reductions of
the same size in the debt-to-GDP ratio was implemented in the simulated economy, with
varying speeds of debt reduction in each simulation.
The experiments culminated in three main results: i) Fiscal consolidations have a
positive aggregate effect on welfare, but the welfare effects are heterogeneous across the
wealth distribution. The reason being that when debt is reduced, there is a positive
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welfare effect via higher wages, but an ambiguous aggregate effect via lower interest rates,
which depends on the wealth position of households. While borrowers win, savers lose
out. Overall, in the experimental economy consolidations are found to improve aggregate
welfare since there is a larger fraction of the calibrated population reliant on labor income,
with this fraction also being the one whose utility responds more strongly to marginal
increases in income. The aggregate gains, come, however, at the expense of the the
rich, which optimally desire no consolidation. ii) Welfare improvements are larger in
spending-based than in tax-based consolidations, albeit the rich and the poor disagree
on the preference for the fiscal instrument. iii) Ideally, the speed of fiscal consolidations
should be slow, and the adjustment as smooth as possible. It is argued that by spreading
the adjustment, the government helps credit constrained agents and the wealth-poor to
smooth out consumption, which otherwise would be impossible due to the inability of
these agents to borrow. As these individuals derive the most value from an additional
unit of income, their utility increases substantially, and thus there are aggregate welfare
gains to be made from slowing down the pace of adjustment.
Future expansions of this work will firstly consider relaxing the closed economy as-
sumption. The welfare effects depicted depended on the direct influence of government
debt on the economy’s macro variables. With most countries nowadays having a large
portion of debt owned by foreigners, the significance of this influence could be starkly
reduced were the model set for an open economy. Still, there is empirical evidence for the
predictions of the neoclassical model regarding government debt holding, see Laubach
(2009). Furthermore, some of the next steps in this research would be to test the ro-
bustness of the mechanisms by calibrating the model to other economies, or to consider
a different mix of fiscal instruments in testing the welfare response, such as capital or
consumption taxation. Finally, a more advanced stage of this work could evolve to a
New-Keynesian framework with nominal rigidities and a role for monetary policy.
In terms of real life policy implications, firstly, there is evidence for governments
holding some redistributive power in debt reductions (or increases) via the real interest
rate channel, when debt is nationally owned. This is especially relevant in the context
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of the 21st century, with wealth and income inequality being amongst the most hotly
debated social and economic issues. Furthermore, this work is a further argument for the
indebted OECD countries to implement a slow, gradual deleveraging process, and to take
advantage of the current favorable market sentiment that will allow them to do so.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Tax Function
Given the tax function 15:
ya = θ0y
1−θ1
which we employ, the average tax rate is defined as
ya = (1− τ(y))y
and thus
θ0y
1−θ1 = (1− τ(y))y
implying that,
1− τ(y) = θ0y
−θ1
τ(y) = 1− θ0y
−θ1
T (y) = τ(y)y = y − θ0y
1−θ1
T ′(y) = 1− (1− θ1)θ0y
−θ1
Thus the tax wedge for any two incomes (y1, y2) is given by:
1−
1− τ(y2)
1− τ(y1)
= 1−
(
y2
y1
)−θ1
(20)
and therefore independent of the scaling parameter θ0. Thus by construction one can raise
average taxes by lowering θ0 and not change the progressivity of the tax code, since (as
long as tax progressivity is defined by the tax wedges) the progressivity of the tax code16
15This appendix is borrowed from Holter et al. (2017)
16Note that
1− τ(y) =
1− T ′(y)
1− θ1
> 1− T ′(y)
and thus as long as θ1 ∈ (0, 1) we have that
T ′(y) > τ(y)
is uniquely determined by the parameter θ1.
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8.2 Calibration data
Table 5: Germany: Exogenously calibrated parameters
Description Parameter Value Source
Preferences
Inverse Frisch elasticity η 1.000 Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
Risk aversion parameter σ 1.2000 Literature
Labor Income
Parameter 1 age profile of wages γ1 0.176 Brinca et al. (2016)
Parameter 2 age profile of wages γ2 -0.003 Brinca et al. (2016)
Parameter 3 age profile of wages γ3 0.000 Brinca et al. (2016)
Variance of permanent ability σa 0.423 Brinca et al. (2016)
Persistence of idiosyncratic risk ρu 0.335 Brinca et al. (2016)
Technology
Capital Share of Output α 0.330 Literature
Depreciation rate δ 0.060 Literature
Government and Social Security
Consumption tax rate τc 0.155 Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
Capital income tax rate τk 0.233 Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
Tax scale parameter θ0 0.881 Brinca et al. (2018)
Tax progressivity parameter θ1 0.160 Brinca et al. (2018)
Government debt-to-GDP B/Y 0.489 FRED
SS tax employers τ˜ss 0.206 OECD
SS tax employees τss 0.210 OECD
Table 6: Germany: Endogenously calibrated parameters
Description Parameter Value
Discount Factor 1 β1 0.951
Discount Factor 1 β2 0.997
Discount Factor 3 β3 0.952
Disutility of work χ 16.93
Borrowing Limit b 0.090
Variance of idiosyncratic risk σu 0.439
Bequest utility ϕ 0.36
28
8.3 Definition of the Transition Equilibrium
As in Brinca et al. (2018), between the initial and final steady states, the recursive
competitive equilibrium is formally defined as follows:
Given the initial stock of capital, the initial distribution of households and tax system,
denoted respectively by K0, Φ0 and {τl, τc, τk, τss, τ˜ss}
t=∞
t=1 , a competitive equilibrium
is a sequence of: i) individual functions for the household, {Vt, ct, k
′
t, nt}
t=∞
t=1 ; ii) pro-
duction plans for the firm, {Kt, Lt}
t=∞
t=1 , factor prices,{rt, wt}
t=∞
t=1 , government transfers
{gt,Ψt, Gt}
t=∞
t=1 , government debt, {Bt}
t=∞
t=1 , inheritance from the dead, {Γt}
t=∞
t=1 and of
households {Φt}
t=∞
t=1 such that for all t:
G˙iven the factor prices and the initial conditions the consumers’ optimization problem
is solved by the value function V (k, β, a, u, j) and the policy functions c(k, β, a, u, j),
k′(k, β, a, u, j) and n(k, β, a, u, j).
2. Markets clear:
Kt+1 +Bt =
∫
ktdΦt
Lt =
∫ [
nt(kt, β, a, u, j)
]
dΦt∫
ctdΦt +Kt+1 +Gt = (1− δ)Kt +K
α
t L
1−α
3. The factor prices satisfy:
wt = (1− α)
(
Kt
Lt
)α
rt = α
(
Kt
Lt
)α−1
− δ
4. The government budget balances:
gt
∫
dΦt +Gt + rtBt =
∫ [
τkrt(kt + Γt) + τcct + ntτl
(
ntwt(j, a, u)
1 + τ˜ss
)]
dΦt +Bt+1 − Bt
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5. The social security system balances:
Ψt
∫
j≥65
dΦt =
[
τ˜ss + τss
1 + τ˜ss
(∫
j<65
ntwtdΦt
)]
6. The assets of the dead are uniformly distributed among the living:
Γt
∫
j<65
dΦt + Γ
∫
j≥65
ω(j)dΦt =
∫
(1− ω(j))ktdΦt
7. Aggregate law of Motion:
Φt+1 = Υt(Φt)
8.4 Dataset on Multi-Year Fiscal Plans (1978-2013)
Table 1 illustrates the merger of the data in Appendix 1 of Alesina, Favero and Gi-
avazzi (2015b) with the data on the Web Appendix of Alesina et al. (2015a), along
with the modifications introduced in the scope of this work. There are two methodological
changes compared with the authors’ fiscal plans:
1. Years where the improvement in government finances was 0 were ex-
cluded. The authors report in the data years for which fiscal measures were announced
for subsequent periods, but in which there was no consolidation. In coherence with the
fiscal experiment, only positive shocks are considered as part of fiscal plans. The excluded
data points are: Canada 1983, Denmark 2010, France 1988 and 1998, Spain 1991.
2. Years with negative fiscal adjustments were excluded, for the same reason
as in point 1. The excluded data points are: France 1989 and 1999-2000, Germany 1998,
Portugal 2003, Spain 1990, USA 1979, 1983-1984 and 1987.
In addition to the authors’ data, Table 8 presents for each fiscal plan, the measures
of speed detailed in Section 5.1, the number of years of the plan, N , and the average
yearly adjustment, A. The average yearly adjustment (A), was calculated in each plan by
computing the average of the fiscal improvements as a % of GDP throughout the plan’s
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years. Below is an example of the calculations, for the fiscal plan Portugal 2010-2013.
Table 7: Portugal 2010-2013
Fiscal Plan Years Fiscal adjustment (%GDP)
Portugal 2010-2013
2010 1.16
2011 3.94
2012 5.20
2013 3.40
A =
1.16 + 3.94 + 5.20 + 3.40
4
= 3.43
It can be interpreted as the average pp reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio each
period, had government accounts been initially balanced and no other changes made to
the budget but the ones depicted by the consolidation data. This way, in the first period
the debt-to-GDP would have improved by 1.16pp, in the second by 3.94 and so on. In
these conditions, the debt-to-GDP ratio would improve, on average, 3.43 pp each year of
the fiscal episode.
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Table 8: Fiscal Plans Data 1978-2013
Fiscal Plan Years Fiscal adjustment (%GDP) Average yearly adjustment No Years
Australia 1985-1988
1985 0.45
0.6175 4
1986 1.02
1987 0.9
1988 0.1
Australia 1994-1999
1994 0.25
0.41 6
1995 0.50
1996 0.62
1997 0.70
1998 0.37
1999 0.04
Austria 1980-1981
1980 0.80
1.18 21981 1.56
Austria 1984 1984 2.04 2.04 1
Austria 1996-1997
1996 2.41
1.99 21997 1.56
Austria 2001-2002
2001 1.02
0.79 22002 0.55
Austria 2011-2013
2011 0.69
0.81 32012 0.89
2013 0.85
Belgium 1982-1985
1982 1.66
1.44 4
1983 1.79
1984 0.69
1985 1.61
Belgium 1987 1987 2.80 2.80 1
Belgium 1990 1990 0.60 0.60 1
Belgium 1992-1994
1992 1.79
1.29 31993 0.92
1994 1.15
Belgium 1996-1997
1996 1.30
0.86 21997 0.41
Belgium 2010-2013
2010 1.03
1.48 4
2011 0.70
2012 2.46
2013 1.73
Canada 1984-1997
1984 0.20
0.56 14
1985 1.03
1986 0.99
1987 0.28
1988 0.30
1989 0.31
1990 0.86
1991 0.40
1992 0.21
1993 0.35
1994 0.49
1995 0.99
1996 0.97
1997 0.47
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Table 9: Fiscal Plans Data 1978-2013 (continuation)
Fiscal Plan Years Fiscal adjustment (%GDP) Average yearly adjustment No Years
Denmark 1983-1985
1983 2.77
2.23 31984 2.38
1985 1.54
Denmark 1995 1995 0.30 0.30 1
Denmark 2011-2013
2011 1.00
1.03 32012 0.90
2013 1.20
Finland 1992-1997
1992 0.91
1.91 6
1993 3.71
1994 3.46
1995 1.65
1996 1.47
1997 0.23
France 1979 1979 0.85 0.85 1
France 1987 1987 0.26 0.26 1
France 1991-1992
1991 0.25
0.18 21992 0.10
France 1995-1997
1995 0.28
0.71 31996 1.34
1997 0.50
France 2011-2013
2011 2.48
2.48 32012 2.12
2013 2.84
Great Britain 1979-1982
1979 0.27
0.62 4
1980 0.08
1981 1.58
1982 0.53
Great Britain 1994-1999
1994 0.83
0.45 6
1995 0.28
1996 0.30
1997 0.79
1998 0.31
1999 0.21
Great Britain 2010-2013
2010 0.40
0.80 4
2011 0.92
2012 0.86
2013 1.02
Ireland 1982-1988
1982 2.80
1.44 7
1983 2.50
1984 0.29
1985 0.12
1986 0.74
1987 1.65
1988 1.95
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Table 10: Fiscal Plans Data 1978-2013 (continuation)
Fiscal Plan Years Fiscal adjustment (%GDP) Average yearly adjustment No Years
Ireland 2009-2013
2009 4.80
3.37 5
2010 4.70
2011 3.32
2012 1.95
2013 2.06
Italy 1991-1998
1991 2.77
2.49 8
1992 3.51
1993 5.12
1994 1.43
1995 4.20
1996 0.35
1997 1.82
1998 0.68
Italy 2010-2013
2010 0.42
1.87 4
2011 1.47
2012 3.40
2013 2.20
Japan 1979-1983
1979 0.12
0.38 5
1980 0.21
1981 0.43
1982 0.71
1983 0.42
Japan 1997-1998
1997 1.43
0.96 21998 0.48
Japan 2003 - 2007
2003 0.48
0.45 5
2004 0.64
2005 0.28
2006 0.72
2007 0.15
Netherlands 1981-1988
1981 1.75
1.62 8
1982 1.71
1983 3.24
1984 1.76
1985 1.24
1986 1.74
1987 1.48
1988 0.05
Netherlands 1991-1993
1991 0.87
0.84 31992 0.74
1993 0.92
Netherlands 2004-2005
2004 1.70
1.10 22005 0.50
Germany 1982-1984
1982 1.18
0.74 31983 0.87
1984 0.18
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Table 11: Fiscal Plans Data 1978-2013 (continuation)
Fiscal Plan Years Fiscal adjustment (%GDP) Average yearly adjustment No Years
Germany 1991-1995
1991 1.11
0.74 5
1992 0.46
1993 0.11
1994 0.91
1995 1.09
Germany 1997 1997 1.60 1.60 1
Germany 1999-2000
1999 0.30
0.50 22000 0.70
Germany 2003-2004
2003 0.74
0.57 22004 0.40
Germany 2006 2006 0.50 0.50 1
Germany 2011-2012
2011 0.43
0.58 22012 0.72
Portugal 1983 1983 2.3 2.3 1
Portugal 2000 2000 0.50 0.50 1
Portugal 2002 2002 1.60 1.60 1
Portugal 2005 - 2007
2005 0.60
1.22 32006 1.65
2007 1.40
Portugal 2010-2013
2010 1.16
3.43 4
2011 3.94
2012 5.20
2013 3.40
Spain 1983-1984
1983 1.90
1.51 21984 1.12
Spain 1989 1989 1.22 1.22 1
Spain 1992-1997
1992 0.70
1.24 6
1993 1.10
1994 2.40
1995 0.74
1996 1.30
1997 1.20
Spain 2009-2013
2009 0.30
3.18 5
2010 2.90
2011 2.54
2012 3.80
2013 6.35
Sweden 1984 1984 0.90 0.90 1
Sweden 1993-1998
1993 1.81
1.77 6
1994 0.78
1995 3.50
1996 2.00
1997 1.50
1998 1.00
35
Table 12: Fiscal Plans Data 1978-2013 (continuation)
Fiscal Plan Years Fiscal adjustment (%GDP) Average yearly adjustment No Years
USA 1978 1978 0.14 0.14 1
USA 1980-1981
1980 0.06
0.15 21981 0.23
USA 1985-1986
1985 0.21
0.16 21986 0.10
USA 1988 1988 0.85 0.85 1
USA 1990-1998
1990 0.33
0.44 9
1991 0.58
1992 0.53
1993 0.32
1994 0.90
1995 0.53
1996 0.29
1997 0.30
1998 0.15
USA 2011-2013
2011 0.04
0.24 32012 0.14
2013 0.53
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